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Stephens: The Address of the President - The Taxonomic Unit

THE ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT
THE TAXONOMIC UNIT

T. C. STEPHEXS
The retiring president is expected to follow the custom of addressing the Academy upon some subject of general interest.
Fortunately, custom does not require that such an address
shall embody one's own research or investigation; but it may
consist of a survey, or of reflections of a general nature.
It so happens that certain fields in which I have been somewhat interested have brought me to a study of the problem of
the taxonomic unit in biology.
One difficulty which concerns many working biologists, and
which seems to be becoming more and more acute, is the determination of the living forms upon which they work.
Insofar as zoological and botanical work is to have a permanent value in science it must at all times be open to verification;
and it must at all times be possible to relate observations precisely to the natural forms upon which they were made. The
necessity of stability in nomenclature is obvious to all.
Our studies in nature have proceeded so far, and differentiations are becoming so refined, that the problem of nomenclatural
stability is becoming one of concern. In fact, there may be no
such thing as stability; in which case the problem would be to
build up a system that would cause the least amount of confusion
in its operation.
The "species question" is not new to you ; and to most of you
who are concerned with the biological field, at least, the tendencies are familiar. I have been loath to present to you a discussion
of the species question, partly because of its venerable theme,
and partly because it has received the attention of some of the
most illustrious biologists, both of the past and of the present.
In fact, I think it was Darwin who exclaimed "How painfully
true it is that no one has the right to examine the question of
species who has not minutely described many." With this warning a wiser soul might hesitate to proceed further. And yet,
·•
the subject is one that cannot be evaded, and is one which cannot
be solved for us by the science of any previous period.
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1920
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In its philosophical aspects the species question is of interest;
but from that point of view there is no pressing need of solution.
As a scientific problem, however, it affects our daily work, and
may become a barrier to progress.
Much has been said of the ideality versus the reality of the
species concept. \Vhile the conception of a species may be purely
a matter of the mind; and while there may still exist the debatable
question as to whether the group or the individual is the real
unit in nature; yet the fact remains that in practice we must have
a unit.
\Vhen we endeavor to trace the historical development of any
general idea in science it is customary to look as far back, at
least, as Aristotle for a starting point. But in this case we do not
find that Aristotle possessed any clear and defined notion of what
we now call species. He recognized, and had names for, the
different kinds of animals and plants, of course; but these differentiations were probably not based upon any generalized
notions.
The first definition of species is usually attributed to John Ray,
the Englishman, who lived in the seventeenth century. The dominant principle in Ray's conception was community of descent.
As interpreted by Hertwig, Ray's definition of species was as
follows: "For plants there is no other more certain characteristic for determining species than their origin from the seeds of
specifically or individually like parents; that is to say, generalized
for all organisms, to one and the same species belong individuals
which spring from similar ancestors."
The next important contribution to the subject was made by
Linnaeus, who said: "There are as many different species as
there were different forms created in the beginning by the Infinite
Being." ("Species tot sunt diversas formas ab initio creavit
infinitum ens.") The problem in Linnaeus's time was to establish
the reality of species and their immutability, rather than to examine critically the criteria by which they might be recognized.
Buffon's definition was: "A constant succession of individuals
similar to and capable of reproducing each other." DeCandolle
defined a species as "an assemblage of af1 those individuals which
resemble each other more than they do others, and which are
able to reproduce their like, in such a manner that they may be
supposed by analogy to have descended from a single being or a
single pair."
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Johannes :'.\J uller and De Quatrefages followed in the same line
of thought. The former referred to a species as "a living form
represented by individual being, which reappears in the product of
generation with certain invariable characters, and is constantly
reproduced by the generative act of similar individuals." While
De Quatrefages defined species as "an assemblage of individuals
more or less resembling one another, which are descended or may
be regarded as being descended, from a single pair by an uninterrupted succession of families." In these earlier years the conception of species was dominated by the principles of immutability
and discontinuity.
More recently there has been a tendency to emphasize the value
of physiological functions in the diagnosis of species and varieties. This seems to be an especially easy point of view for the
student of bacteria and smaller fungi. The metabolic processes
of the bacteria, for instance, seem to be more readily distinguished, if not more constant, than the structural peculiarities.
And, of course, a very excellent case can be made out for the
specificity of such physiological characters. It must be borne in
mind, ho\vever, that back of every physiological process there
must be a morphological organization which carries the same specific peculiarity. The same may be said of peculiar and characteristic secretions, such as gums, oils, alkaloids, etc.
During the early part of the preceding generation there was a
trend away from the Linnaean conception of species. Thus,
Huxley expressed his conception of species in this language:
"\Vhen we call a group of animals, or of plants, a species, we may
imply thereby, either that all these animals or plants have some
common peculiarity of form or structure; or we may mean that
they possess some common functional character."
Haeckel says that the word species "serves as the common designation of all individual animals or plants which are equal in
all essential matters of form, and are only distinguished by quite
subordinate characters."
In this latter group of definitions we will observe that the
principle of structural similarity is dominant. Nothing can be
more evident to the biologist, who is compelled to deal, even superficially, with the nomenclature of organisms, than that fundamental concepts and terms are in marked process of change. Half
a century ago Professor Owen remarked: "I apprehend that few
naturalists nowadays, in describing and proposing a name for
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what they call a 'new species,' use the term to signify what was
meant by it twenty or thirty years ago." 1 It may be agreed that
concepts must change with the development of knowledge, but
it would seem that scientific terminology ought to remain as near
constant as possible.
After this rather brief historical survey of the species concept
it will be germane to inquire as to what concrete criteria have been,
or can be applied. The analysis shows that there are three such
criteria, viz., the genetic, the physiological, and the morphological.
The idea that hereditary descent is the essential test of specific
rank seems to be the oldest and original point of view. As intimated, this was Ray's conception. This criterion is definite,
but it fails in allowing for no expansion, no evolution. By virtue
of continuity a species is always the same species. And this is
manifestly in contradiction to the modern viewpoint. This criterion furnishes the basis for the modern principle of intergradation.
The criterion of relationship can have little value, because all
forms and all groups, including subspecies, species, genera, etc.,
are related in this sense. So that relationship is a common property, and not a differential character. Furthermore, in nature it
is usually impossible to know the parentage of forms.
The physiological test of species has had a long and honorable
past. Many older writers were quite firmly convinced that true
species could not interbreed. So that, interspecific sterility was
accepted as a true test of a proper species. Time has shown,
however, that it is not.
There are recorded cases of sterility in hybrids; rhere are
recorded cases where sterility results from a cross in one direction,
and fertility results from a cross in the other direction; there are
recorded cases where fertility results from a cross in both directions; and there are, apparently, a few cases in which the hybrid
shows a greater degree of fertility than in normal fertilization.
Such facts indicate, no doubt, that all species do not possess
the same degree of difference, physiologically, at least. But they
also show that there is no constancy in the matter of sterility in
hybrid offspring, and that such a criterion cannot be used in the
test of species.
Aside from the matter of reproduction some functions have
been regarded as having specific value; for example, in the pro1

"On the Osteology of the Chimpanzees and Orangs."
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duction of certain secretions, such as gums, alkaloids, etc. Most
especially, in the study of large groups of minute parasitic organisms, like the bacteria and other fungi, the effects of their metabolic activities upon living hosts or upon culture media not only
are characteristic, but are quite easily discerned. The minute size
of many of these organisms makes the application of the morphological test somewhat difficult. And while expediency may justify
the use of physiological characters in such cases, this should not
blind us in recognizing the inadequacy of this principle in general.
We may now consider the morphological criterion, viz., that
similarity of structure brings individuals within the limits of the
specific group, regardless of ancestry - known or unknown.
It goes without saying, almost, that we can have no other criterion for extinct species, whuse only remains are structural.
ln the examination: of structure we are able to measure and
compare. All of the data are present. It remains but to fix the
limits and bounds. Such a criterion of species harmonizes with
the conception of a variable and mutable species.
But when the species varies or mutates beyond the confines of
the defined species it becomes something else, under our eyes,
just as we assume others have done in the prehistoric past. For,
in the words of L. H. Bailey, ''This notion that a species, to be
a species, must have originated in nature's garden, and not in
man's, has been left over to us from the last generation." 2
The taxonomists of the present generation in science have not
entirely graduated from the Linnaean conception of species, particularly as it includes the idea of fixity; although they are prone
to look with disdain upon his meager binomial vocabulary. They
mistake continuity for fixity and immutability. In their laudable
efforts to harmonize classification with the probable phylogenetic
history they forget that all groups above the individual are, in a
measure, artificial and arbitrary, and of necessity must be, since
we have no authentic record of their phylogenesis.
Our conclusion is, then, that the only true and scientific criterion of species is the one based upon morphology.
To what extent may the differentiations of living organisms be
useful to science? \Vhat degree of difference should be recognized taxonomically? We may readily understand that where
such living forms are under experimental observation for the
purpose of determining genetic relationships, considerable care
in cataloguing minute variations may be necessary; but where
2

Survival of the Unlike, page 110.
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individuals are taken at random in nature, the same thing is not
true.
It is interesting to learn that new forms in a single group
(birds) are being recognized and named at the rate of about one
thousand per decade in a single zoo-geographical region (Africa). 3
Many of these newly described forms are, doubtless, subspecies.
The subspecies is a modern refinement of the older unit, the
species, with the drawback that it is far more difficult to handle,
requiring a considerable amount of material and a degree of skill
possessed only by the specialist. The subspecies unit is being
introduced not only in Africa, but also in America., and not only
among birds, but in other groups of vertebrates and invertebrates,
and in many of the groups of plants. The question as to the
serviceability of this modern unit is, then, germane.
The subspecies lacks even the capacity for exact definement
that is possessed by the Linnaean species. The only characteristic
of subspecies is intergradation. The only avowed justification,
on biological grounds, for recognizing and cataloguing subspecies
is to provide for the possibility of detecting incipient species. 4
That it may be done on other grounds cannot be denied.
But, in order to provide for the very probable possibility of
discovering incipient species some taxonomists, and others, seem
to be willing to submerge the whole nomenclatural system into
confusion and chaos. Perhaps it may be said, without injustice,
that at the present time there are certain groups of both animals
and plants whose taxonomy and nomenclature have reached such
a state of confusion in about a direct proportion to the atttntior.
these groups have received from taxonomists - and this mostly
a result of multiplication of subspecies.
When a group has been pretty thoroughly worked over ior all
the subspecies it will yield there will be nothing left for taxono·
mists to do but to make further revisions with the admission of
hypersubspecies to be designated in tetranomials, and so on. 5
3 The Auk (XXXVI, page 4j2) quotes The Journal fur Ornithologie (January,
1918) as authority for the statement that 979 new forms of birds have been named
for Africa during the years 1905 to 1914.
4 A clear-cut discussion of this question is to be found in certain papers in recent
numbers of the Journal of Mammalogy. Dr. C. H. Merriam attacks the principle of
intergradation and defends the morphological test. (Volume I, No. 1, pp. 6-9, 1919.)
Mr. P. A. Tave ner defends the principle of intergradation.
(Volume I, No. 3, pp.
124·127, 1920.)
5 I am indebted to my colleague, Dr. A. W. Lindsey, for the following contem·
poraneous entomological example of taxonomic excess: F. E. Watson (!ourn. N. Y.
Ent. Soc., XXVIII, page 232, 192()) described and named the following aberrant
form of an Hesperiid, viz., Poanes hobomok form 9 pocalzontas ab. friedlei. Poca·
hontas is merely a melanic unisexual dimorphic form of hobomok, which varies
considerably in the extent of its pale maculation. Friedlei is merely the darkest
form of Pocahontas yet recorded, and its christening seems to carry the matter to an
unnecessary and objectionable degree. And, worst of all, the single type specimen
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There is no logical reason for stopping short of this, and no law
to prevent it. It would seem that the tendency here referred to
is a result of a perverted specialization. One is led to wonder
whether such a practice is designed to further the ends of science,
or to furnish an occupation.
The whole problem of the determination of specific rank has
been in the tentative stage from the beginning, and there is some
reason to suspect that it will always be a matter surrounded with
difficulty and variance of opinion. What is to be gained, therefore, in attempting to establish another hypothetical unit below the
species?
There are two possible conceptions of specific variants. These
variants may be regarded as due to fluctuating( continuous) variations, and their relationship should be represented by some
sort of a radiate pattern, thus:

Or they may be due to orthogenetic variations, and should be
represented in a linear system, thus :

In the latter case, no matter where we assign the ancestral type
in the system, it need not have direct continuity with all of the
other forms. So that, if A, B, C, and D are named forms of
subspecific rank, and if A is regarded as the prototype, then B
may be a subspecies, but not so with C and D. C might be called
a hypersubspecies.
It might be supposed that D would differ from A to such an
extent as to justify specific rank; but, according to a principle
which has grown up in modern systematic zoology, so long as
intergrading forms exist between A and D, the latter cannot be
of friedlei was reared artificially, and under such environmental conditions as pro·
duced also an unusually dark male; but the aberrantly dark male escaped a christening. To some this procedure will seem to be a prostitution of the purposes of taxon·
omy and nomenclature.
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assigned to specific rank. Thus, no matter how unlike A and
D may become, the presumption of common origin, as evidenced
by intergrades, prevents their recognition as distinct species. This
principle (of intergradation) is untenable from a general biological viewpoint because it is inconsistent with the doctrine of
evolution. It is, in fact, a vestige of the discarded doctrine of
immutability of species. How specific rank can be granted to
L3inx canadensis and Lynx ruffus, for instance, and then denied
to the extremes of variation in the Great Horned Owl, merely
because of the existence of intergrades, is a puzzle which puts a
strain on one's logical faculty.
On the other hand, if the study of any group of subspecies or
varieties would permit their arrangement into a radial system,
the explanation would be in harmony with well-understood biological principles, and with the facts of continuous variability.
This system requires a prototype, hypothetical or known, upon
which the name may be bestowed. The radial variates, continuous variations, are designated simply as varieties when it is necessary to distinguish them at all. Theoretically discontinuous
variations produce species at once, and leave no intergrades.
I believe that ornithological taxonomists have found it usually
impossible to determine prototypes among subspecies; and they
have been satisfied merely to catalogue different forms which individual opinion may regard as having subspecific rank. 6
\Vhat is to be gained, of value, by naming continuous variations, or any particular assemblage of continuous variations, such
as a variety or geographic race? \Vill, it not weaken an otherwise fairly satisfactory system of nomenclature? It is quit~~ true
that any one of them may represent an incipient species. And
it is easily conceivable that any one may proceed in the development of still further unlikeness from the form with which it
may be most closely related. The incipiency of this sort of thing
seems to be too small a matter to be provided for in a nomenclatural system. As Loomis says, "In trying to manufacture a
nomenclature for birds of remote ages, past and future, are we
not putting an impediment in the way of the study of existing
birds?" 7
6 It is true that a committee of the American Ornithologists' Union has acted as
a court which accepts or rejects proposals of new forms of North American birds;
for some years the rulings of this committee were satisfactory and generally accepted.
More recently the committee has not, apparently, been functioning. It is assumed that
the flood of "revis.ions," with a perplexing array of newly proposed subspecies, has
laid upon this committee an impossible task. It seems, at least, that such must be
the inevitable outcome of the application of the principles of intergradation, subspecies,
and trinomial nomenclature.
7 The Auk, XX, page 299, 1903.
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Along with the subspecies unit comes trinomial nomenclature.
The greatest objection to this lies, perhaps, in the difficulty involved, and the consequent restriction in use. It will not help
to say that subspecies and trinomials are for the use only of
taxonomic experts, and that others may be co~tent with the
species unit. There must be a common ground in order to promote cooperation and prevent misunderstanding and confusion.
The taxonomist has no license for erecting a system which is unrelated to other biological fields. It must be emphasized that
taxonomy and nomenclature are tools of the biologist, and not
a branch of science sui generis; they serve no useful ends apart
from their relation to other branches of biological knowledge.
Thus the biologist has a right to discuss the manner in which
taxonomy is helpful, or otherwise.
Other objections which have been offered to the subspecies
unit and trinomial nomenclature may be summarized as follows:
(a) There is usually a variance in the judgment of the experts on the relative value of the min\lte characters upon which
subspeciation is based.
(b) Subspecies and trinomials represent no stopping place, but
lead directly to tetranomials and polynomials.
( c) Such ultra-refinement thwarts the purpose of any system
by introducing uncertainty and lack of precision in the ends
which taxonomy is designed to serve. For the sake of argument
we might grant that the expert taxonomist might be able to
work precisely even with subspecies, but we would immediately
reply that that, in itself, would serve no useful end. ·when we
split our subspecies one or more times we will be back to the
good old pre-Linnaean days when, as pointed out by Loomis, 8 the
Mockingbird was distinguished by the name of Turdus minor
cinero-albus non-inaculatus. Yet this is simplicity in comparison
with the multiplicity of trinomially designated forms which only
a half dozen persons in the world, perhaps, are qualified to determine.
(cl) As urged by some of the British ornithologists when the
trinomial system was proposed by the American school, perhaps
the greatest objection is its liability to abuse. That such abuse
has been practiced one example will suffice to show. In the
recent pages of the leading American ornithological journal a new
subspecies of teal duck was described, in which the differential
character was the extension of a white crescentic patch from the
s The Auk, XX,

pp. 294-299, 1901.
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front of the head around to the mid-occipital region, where the
two white bands fused. 9 In the next issue of the same journal a
writer reported that a duck of the same supposed subspecies,
which had been kept in captivity in a public park, had molted a
splendid example of the species. 10
Finally, and in summary, the preceding remarks may be interpreted as a protest against the substitution of the subspecies for
the species as a taxonomic unit. It seems unnecessary to offer
evidence that there is a strong tendency in this direction.
Simple binomial nomenclature permits the designation of subspecific forms (i.e., varieties) where necessary in biological investigation, by the use of the term "variety" (usually abbreviated)
followed by the varietal name. By this method no attempt is
made to establish a new unit, and yet it provides a means of distinction where such is needed. By it incipient species may be
recognized without jeopardizing the usefulness of the specific
unit. In other words we would return to the status quo prior
to the use of the trinomial.system.
9 The Auk,. XXXVI, pp. 455-460, 1919.
10 The Auk, XXXVII, pp. 126·127, 1920.

https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pias/vol27/iss1/7

10

